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Federal Taxation
by Michael H. Plowgian*
Svetoslav S. Minkov**
and Mark S. Davis***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The courts in the Eleventh Circuit heard a number of relatively
prominent tax related cases in 2007. In United States v. Mount Sinai
Medical Center of Florida,Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit held that medical

residents are potentially eligible for the student exemption from social
security taxes, with their eligibility being determined on a case-by-case
basis.2

In Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner,3 the Eleventh Circuit

vacated the United States Tax Court's valuation methodology in
computing, for estate tax purposes, the net asset value of a holding
company in which the decedent held a minority interest.4 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the decedent's estate should be allowed a full dollar-fordollar discount for the tax liability associated with the built-in gain in
the holding company's assets.5 In addition, in Womack v. Commissioner,' the Eleventh Circuit joined the list of federal courts of appeals that
have consistently held that the proceeds from the sale of rights to future
* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Washington, D.C. Denison University
(B.A., 1999); Tufts University (M.A.L.D., 2003); Harvard University (J.D., 2003).
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Sofia University
(Bulgarian J.D. equivalent, 1999); University of Illinois (L.L.M., 2001); University of Illinois
(J.D., 2004); University of Illinois (J.S.D., 2004).
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Dartmouth
College (A.B., 2003); Harvard University (J.D., 2006).
This Article does not represent the views of King & Spalding LLP but solely reflects the
views of its Authors.
1. 486 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 1253.
3. 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).
4. Id. at 1319.
5. Id.
6. 510 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
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installment payments of state lottery winnings are taxed as ordinary
income, rather than as capital gains.7 In a long and very fact-intensive
opinion in Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court, on remand
from the Eleventh Circuit, 9 upheld its earlier finding that Claude M.
Ballard and others had fraudulently failed to report income from a
kickback scheme.1" In United States v. Coastal Utilities, Inc.,' the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted
the government's motion for summary judgment and held that universal
support payments received by a telephone company from the federal
government and access funds received from Georgia were income to 12
a
telephone company, not contributions to capital not subject to tax.
Finally, in Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States," the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a
partnership's motion for summary judgment and held that the extended
six-year statute of limitations applied to allow an adjustment of
partnership items related to a tax shelter transaction.' 4
II.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES

A. Eligibility of Medical Residents for Student Exemption from
Social Security Taxes Must Be Determined on a Case-By-Case Basis
In United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida,Inc. (Mount
Sinai I),"s the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
reversing a district court decision, held that medical residents are
potentially eligible for the student exemption from social security taxes
16
under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA").
Under FICA, both employers and employees are taxed on wages that
employers pay to their employees as remuneration for "employment."' 7
These taxes are used to fund the federal social security program."8 The

7. Id. at 1307.
8. 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007).
9. Ballard v. Comm'r, 429 F.3d 1026, 1032 (11th Cir. 2005).
10. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 805.
11. 483 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (S.D. Ga. 2007).
12. Id. at 1251. On January 23, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision in a per curiam opinion that adopted the district court's order in full. See United
States v. Coastal Utils., Inc., 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
13. No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007).
14. Id. at *12.
15. 486 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2007).
16. Id. at 1253; I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
17. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
18. Mount Sinai 11, 486 F.3d at 1250.
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term "employment" is defined, for FICA purposes, as "any service, of
whatever nature, performed . . by an employee for the person employing him."19 A number of relationships are excluded from the definition
of employment.2 ° Among these exclusions is the "student exemption,"
which covers any "service performed in the employ of ... a school,
college, or university... if such service is performed by a student who
is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school, college, or
university."2
In 2002 the United States brought a complaint against Mount Sinai
Medical Center of Florida, Inc. ("Mount Sinai"), claiming that the
Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") had issued to Mount Sinai an
erroneous refund in the amount of $2,450,177 in 2000 and 2001. This
amount was attributable to FICA taxes paid and withheld by Mount
Sinai for payments made to medical residents in Mount Sinai's graduate
medical education program for the tax years of 1996 through 1999.22
The medical residents who enrolled in the program did not pay tuition
or fees, but rather received either uniform salaries or stipends from
Mount Sinai to perform medical functions in the medical center. The
medical residents also participated in an educational program that
included numerous conferences, core curriculum classes, graded
examinations, and textbook readings.2 3 Based on the educational
aspects of the medical residency program, Mount Sinai contended that
the refund was proper because the underlying payments to its medical
residents fell under the student exemption from FICA taxation.24
In 2005 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida determined that the student exemption to FICA does not cover
wages paid to medical residents. 2' The court first noted that the terms
"employment" and "wages" should be construed broadly in this context
to promote broad coverage under social security.26 Quoting the United
States Supreme Court, the district court explained that "'federal social
security legislation is an attack on recognized evils in our national

19. I.R.C. § 3121(b) (2000).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 3121(b)(10).
22. United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc. (Mount Sinai I), 353 F. Supp.
2d 1217, 1218-19 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
23. Id. at 1220.
24. Id. at 1219.
25. Id. at 1230. For a more detailed discussion of the district court's decision, see
Michael H. Plowgian, Svetoslav S. Minkov & T. Wesley Brinkley, Federal Taxation, 57
MERCER L. REV. 1115, 1130 (2006).
26. Mount Sinai I, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.

1196

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

economy, [and thus] a constricted interpretation
of the phrasing by the
' 27
courts would not comport with its purpose. '
The court next turned to the legislative history of the student
exemption and the related exemptions that have, at different times,
applied to doctors.28 In particular, the court focused on the sincerepealed medical intern exception to FICA tax, which exempted
payments for "'[slervice performed as an interne in the employ of a
hospital by an individual who has completed a four years' course in a
medical school chartered or approved pursuant to [sitate law.'" 29 The
medical intern exception was added to the Internal Revenue Code in
1939.30 According to the district court's opinion, the House Report
accompanying the 1939 amendments "made clear that the [medical]
intern exception did not apply to [medical] residents,"31 but instead
applied only to medical interns, who are generally defined as individuals
in the first year of a medical residency program.32 A similar exception
covered self-employed physicians.33 As a result, between 1939 and
1965, many medical residents were subject to FICA tax even though they
were exempt from FICA prior to becoming medical residents and would
likely be exempt again once they became practicing physicians.3 4 In St.
Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. United States,35 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the seeming inequity of this
regime as applied to medical residents. 36 Nonetheless, the court held
that medical residents were subject to FICA tax while medical interns
and self-employed physicians were not. 37 Rather than expanding the
exceptions to include medical residents, however, Congress responded to
St. Luke's in 1965 by repealing the medical intern and self-employed
physician exceptions."
The district court in Mount Sinai I determined that based on the
legislative history of the 1965 amendments, Congress repealed the

27. Id. at 1223 (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947)).
28. Id. at 1223-24.
29. Id. at 1223 (quoting Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379,
§ 601, 53 Stat. 1360, 1385).
30. Id.; § 601, 53 Stat. at 1385.
31. Mount Sinai I, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (citing H.R. REP. No. 76-728 (1939),
reprintedin 1939-2 C.B. 538, 550-51).
32. Id. at 1219.
33. See id. at 1224.
34. Id. at 1225.
35. 333 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1964).
36. Mount Sinai 1, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1225-26; see St. Luke's, 333 F.2d at 164.
37. St. Luke's, 333 F.2d at 160.
38. Mount Sinai 1, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1226, citing to Social Security Amendments of
1965, § 311(B)(1), 79 Stat. 381.
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medical intern exception in order to include medical interns within the
social security program, not, as Mount Sinai had posited, because the
student exemption already covered medical interns. 9 Based on
Congress's intent to narrow the exceptions to FICA, as well as Congress's knowledge of the Sixth Circuit's decision in St. Luke's, the district
court determined that Congress did not intend to exempt medical
residents from FICA taxation and found in favor of the government.4 °
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
the district court, holding that the lower court's reliance on legislative
history was improper.4 The Eleventh Circuit criticized the district
court's failure to analyze whether the language of the student exemption
was ambiguous before turning to the legislative history of the statute for
guidance.42 Performing its own analysis of the language of the student
exemption, the court of appeals concluded that the statute's language
was not ambiguous and therefore did not, as a matter of law, preclude
Mount Sinai "from attempting to prove that its residents' services
qualify for the student exemption."43 Instead, the court determined
that the statute prompted a factual inquiry into whether a medical
resident in Mount Sinai's residency program is a "'student'" and whether
he or she is employed by a "'school, college, or university."'44 Such a
factual inquiry is not contrary to the FICA statutory scheme, the court
reasoned, because medical residents are not excluded from the student
exemption by the exemption's language, and no separate provision
mandates FICA taxation of payments to medical residents.45 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the government's assertion that the
court should adopt a bright-line rule that medical residents can never be
covered by the student exemption.4 6 The court held that a "case-bycase analysis" was necessary to determine whether the exemption
applies to medical residents.4 7
Despite the Eleventh Circuit's determination that the legislative
history of the student exemption was not controlling in this case, the
court analyzed the legislative history relied upon by the district court
and found it unpersuasive." The court was not persuaded by the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

353 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
Id. at 1227-28, 1230.
Mount Sinai 11, 486 F.3d at 1253.
See id. at 1251.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253 (quoting I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10)).
See id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id. at 1252-53.
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decision in St. Luke's because the Sixth Circuit opinion only analyzed
whether the medical intern exception, not the student exemption,
applied to medical residents.49 Consequently, "[t]he fact that Congress
repealed the entirely separate [medical] intern exemption in 1965," in
the wake of St. Luke's, "is irrelevant to the question of whether [medical]
residents may qualify for the student exemption under the plain
language of the statute." ° The Eleventh Circuit likewise dismissed the
district court's determination that the Eleventh Circuit's reading of the
student exemption would have rendered the medical intern exemption
superfluous if it applied to medical residents." According to the court
of appeals, the medical intern exception would have been superfluous
only if one assumed that a medical intern was always a "'student"' and
that a "'hospital"' was always a "'school, college, or university,"' which
the Eleventh Circuit concluded was not a fair assumption. 52
The Eleventh Circuit largely bypassed an analysis of the legislative
history of the FICA exemptions at issue and, in the process, abandoned
a bright-line rule for a standard that could be the catalyst for litigation
concerning any number of hospitals with medical residency programs.
The Sixth Circuit's holding in St. Luke's and the ensuing congressional
contraction of the FICA exemptions applicable to medical school
graduates suggests that Congress intended to maintain the application
of FICA taxation to medical residents. To justify its decision not to
consider the legislative history of the student exemption, the court of
appeals pointed out, correctly, that the district court omitted a discussion of the ambiguity of the student exemption's language. The district
court's analysis of the legislative history suggests, however, that the
court found the meaning of "student" and "school, college, or university"
to be ambiguous within the context of the student exemption. In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit provided very little analysis as to why the
student exemption is not ambiguous. The Eleventh Circuit thus ensured
that factual analyses of medical residency programs will have to be
conducted in the courts on a regular basis in order to enforce the student
exemption in the manner Congress intended.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10)).
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B. Value of a Holding Company Is Reduced for Estate Tax Purposes
by the Full Amount of the Tax Liability on the Built-In Gain of the
Company's Assets
In Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner," the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
Tax Court's valuation methodology in computing, for estate tax purposes,
the net asset value of a holding company in which the decedent held a
minority interest. 54 The Tax Court held that in determining the net
asset value of the holding company, the estate should be allowed only a
partial discount for the tax liability associated with the built-in gain in
its assets. The Tax Court determined that the discount should equal the
present value of the company's expected tax liability resulting from the
future sales of the company's assets, projected based on the company's
historic rate of disposition of assets.55 The Eleventh Circuit held that
the decedent's estate should instead be allowed a full dollar-for-dollar
discount for the tax liability associated with the built-in gain in the
holding company's assets as though the company had sold all of its
assets and paid the resulting tax on the date of the decedent's death.5 6
Frazier Jelke III ("Jelke") died in March 1999. 57 Jelke owned 6.44%
of the stock of the Commercial Chemical Company ("CCC"), a closelyheld holding company that was taxed as a C corporation and owned
appreciated marketable securities."
On the date of Jelke's death,
CCC's net asset value, without regard to tax liabilities, equaled
approximately $188 million. CCC also had approximately $51 million
of built-in contingent capital gains tax liability.59 CCC was a long-term
investment vehicle and had an annual asset turnover of six percent.6 °
The CCC shareholders, other than Jelke, were irrevocable trusts (one of
which could not be liquidated prior to 2019), the beneficiaries of which
were all Jelke family members."'
Prior to Jelke's death, there was no
62
intent to liquidate CCC.
On its federal estate tax return, Jelke's estate valued Jelke's stock in
CCC at $4,588,155. The estate calculated that figure by reducing CCC's
net asset value by its $51 million contingent capital gains tax liability,

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1318-19.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id. at 1318 & n.3.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id. at 1320 n.7.
Id. at 1319.
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taking a twenty percent discount for lack of control and a thirty-five
percent discount for lack of marketability. The Service issued a notice
of deficiency, determining that the value of Jelke's stock in CCC was
$9,111,000. The Service used no discount for the built-in capital gains
taxes and used smaller discounts for the lack of control and lack of
marketability. In the Tax Court, Jelke's estate contested the Service's
determination of the fair market value of Jelke's CCC stock and also
contested the proper discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability. The Tax Court rejected the Jelke estate's argument that in
determining the fair market value of the CCC stock, a dollar-for-dollar
discount for CCC's contingent built-in capital gains tax liabilities should
be allowed. Instead, the Tax Court determined that the estate should
be allowed a partial discount of $21 million, which was equal to the
present value of the company's expected tax liability resulting from the
sale of the company's assets over a sixteen-year period (based on the
company's historic turnover rate of six percent).63 The Tax Court also
applied a ten percent discount for lack of control and a fifteen percent
discount for lack of marketability, which the Eleventh Circuit summarily
affirmed.64 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, with the Tax
Court's discount with respect to the contingent built-in capital gains tax
65
liability.
To give some background to the legal issues in this case, what follows
is a brief review of relevant legislation, administrative regulations and
rulings, and judicial decisions affecting both estate tax jurisprudence and
the methodology for valuing built-in capital gains tax. According to
§§ 2031(a)66 and 20337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (the "Code"), a taxable estate generally includes all property of
the decedent at its fair market value. 61 Treasury Regulation § 20.20311(b) 69 provides that the fair market value of property is "the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."" Revenue Ruling

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
Code.
69.
70.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

1319-20.
1320 n.10.
1333.
§ 2031(a).
§ 2033.
§§ 2031(a), 2033. Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the

Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
Id.
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59-607' provides the foundations for analyzing the value of stock of
closely held investment holding companies.72 In particular, section 5(b)
of Revenue Ruling 59-60 states that "[t]he value of the stock of a closely
held investment. . . holding company, whether or not family owned, is
closely related to the value of the assets underlying the stock."73
Therefore, the net asset value method should be favored in valuing the
stock of a closely held investment holding company over the earningsbased method, which is better in valuing operating companies."
However, the application of the net asset value method to contingent
built-in capital gains tax liability has undergone a substantial evolution.
Prior to 1986, as a result of the General Utilities doctrine, and between
1986 and 1998, as a result of the prior precedents, the courts generally
did not allow a deduction for contingent built-in capital gains tax
liability in calculating the net asset value of a corporation when a sale
or liquidation of the corporation was neither planned nor imminent.7"
In 1998 however, in Estate of Davis v. Commissioner," the Tax Court
determined that in a hypothetical sale of the stock of a closely held
corporation that owns marketable securities (when there is no plan for
the liquidation of the corporation or a sale of its assets), the buyer of the
stock would not disregard the built-in capital gains tax.77 Therefore,
the court reasoned, the tax should be reflected in the value of the stock
of the closely held corporation.7" The Tax Court did not allow a
separate discount for the built-in capital gains tax, but it treated a part
of the marketability discount as due to the built-in capital gains tax.7 9
The court's holding in Estate of Davis was solidified by decisions in the
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits that also allowed discounts for built-in

71. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, modified by Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370,
amplified by Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, amplified by Rev. Rul. 80-213, 1980-2 C.B.
101, amplified by Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co., 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see, e.g., Estate of Andrews v.
Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938, 942 (1982) (projected capital gains taxes do not reduce the value of
closely held stock when liquidation is only speculative because it is unlikely taxes will ever
be incurred); Estate of Piper v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1062, 1086-87 (1979) (potential capital
gains tax discount unwarranted under net asset value method when there is no evidence
of a planned liquidation).
76. 110 T.C. 530 (1998).
77. Id. at 550.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 552.
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capital gains taxes but did not specify a methodology for the calculation
of such discounts.8 °
Finally, in 2002 in Dunn v. Commissioner,8 1 the Fifth Circuit went
one step further and held that as a matter of law, a hypothetical willing
buyer or willing seller must always be assumed to immediately liquidate
the corporation, triggering a tax on the built-in gain. 2 Therefore, the
court reasoned, a dollar-for-dollar discount should be allowed for the
built-in capital gains tax liability.8 The decedent in Dunn held a
majority interest (but less than what was necessary under state law to
cause a liquidation of the corporation) in a family-owned corporation.
Eighty-five percent of the corporation's assets were operating assets, and
s4
the other fifteen percent of its assets were investment assets.
It is against this backdrop of legislation, administrative decisions, and
caselaw that Jelke was decided. In Jelke the Eleventh Circuit joined the
Fifth Circuit and held that as a matter of law, a dollar-for-dollar
discount for the contingent built-in capital gains tax liability of a closely
held corporation should be allowed in the valuation, for estate tax
purposes, of a decedent's interest in that corporation.8 5 In so holding,
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the arguments of the Tax Court and the
government that Dunn was distinguishable because the decedent in
Dunn owned a majority interest in a mostly operating company, not a
minority interest in an investment holding company.8 " The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that whether the decedent held a majority or minority
interest was irrelevant because the "willing buyer, willing seller"

80. See Eisenberg v. Comm'r, 155 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998). In Eisenberg the Second
Circuit directed the Tax Court to allow a discount for built-in capital gains tax. Id. at 5759. The court did not specify the exact amount of discount but it suggested in dicta that
a dollar-for-dollar discount was incorrect. See id.; Estate of Welch v. Comm'r, No. 98-2007,
2000 WL 263309, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2000) (suggesting that a dollar-for-dollar discount
was not warranted). In Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001),
the Tax Court allowed a partial discount for built-in capital gains tax based on its estimate
of the net present value of the capital gains tax liability; but the Fifth Circuit remanded
the case with instructions to reconsider the amount of the discount. Id. at 371, 375.
81. 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
82. Id. at 353.
83. Id. at 352-53. In a later decision the Fifth Circuit extended its built-in capital gains
tax analysis to contingent liabilities for other estate taxes. See Succession of McCord v.
Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006) (gift tax). However, the Fifth Circuit declined to
extend its built-in capital gains tax analysis to whether the value of a decedent's individual
retirement accounts should be reduced by the amount of potential income tax liability of
the beneficiaries upon distributions from the account. See Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d
621, 628-29 (5th Cir. 2004).
84. Dunn, 301 F.3d at 346-47.
85. 507 F.3d at 1333.
86. Id. at 1331-32.
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scenario concerns a hypothetical, and not a strategic, buyer/seller (i.e.,
someone who will buy and operate the company), and therefore a
liquidation should be deemed to have taken place on the date of the
decedent's death.87 The Eleventh Circuit further reasoned that, although
the company in Dunn was both an operating and an investment
company, the Fifth Circuit's use of different methods to value the
company's operating and investment assets negated the government's
distinction in that regard was inapposite.8
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that its holding was partially
justified by its desire to provide "certainty and finality" to the valuation
of assets for estate tax purposes, an already "vague and shadowy
undertaking," and to bypass the "unnecessary expenditure of judicial
resources" in evaluating which present value projection was closer to
reality.8 9 The Eleventh Circuit described the Tax Court's approach in
evaluating the present value of the company's contingent capital gains
tax liability as "fluidly ethereal,... requir[ing] a type of hunt-and-peck
forecasting" that would require courts "to either gaze into a crystal ball,
flip a coin, or, at the very least, split the difference between the present
value calculation projections of the taxpayers [and the government].""
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit described its dollar-for-dollar approach
as a simpler, "more logical and appropriate" approach that did not
"resort to present values or prophesies."9
Circuit Judge Carnes dissented from the majority opinion in Jelke,
indicating that while the majority's approach might have been simpler,
it did not reflect economic reality.92 Therefore, Circuit Judge Carnes
reasoned that the majority's approach was inaccurate and an unnecessary oversimplification.
While, from an economic standpoint, the dissenting judge's criticism
of the majority holding appears to be well founded, the Eleventh
Circuit's approach has its virtues. In particular, while not necessarily
reflecting economic reality perfectly, the dollar-for-dollar discount
allowed as a matter of law by the Eleventh Circuit would bring certainty
and finality to the valuation of contingent built-in capital gains tax
liabilities in a taxpayer-friendly manner. More importantly, the

87. Id. at 1331.
88. Id. at 1331-32.
89. Id. at 1332-33.
90. Id. at 1332.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1335-37 (Carnes, Circuit J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Carnes called the
majority's approach a "doctrine of ignoble ease and seductive simplicity," id. at 1337, and
a "perilous delusion," id. at 1340.
93. See id. at 1333-40.
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Eleventh Circuit's decision would prevent future court proceedings on
this question. Thus, the decision, while not easily defensible in its
economic underpinnings, is practical and administrable.
C. The Right to Future Payments of Lottery Winnings Is Not a
CapitalAsset
In Womack v. Commissioner (Womack 11)," the Eleventh Circuit, in
a consolidated case addressing two unrelated taxpayers, affirmed the
Tax Court's holding that the proceeds from the sale of rights to future
installment payments from lottery winnings are taxable as ordinary
income, not as capital gains.95
Roland Womack and Maria Spiridakos (the "Taxpayers") each won a
multimillion dollar prize in the Florida State Lottery in 1996 and 1990,
respectively. The Florida State Lottery did not offer winners the option
of a lump sum payment during the period in which Womack and
Spiridakos won their prizes. Instead, their prizes were to be paid out in
annual installments. Womack was to receive twenty annual payments
of $150,000, and Spiridakos was entitled to twenty annual installments
of $312,000. Until 2000 Womack and Spiridakos each reported these
annual payments on their federal tax returns as ordinary income.96
In 1999 the State of Florida amended its law to permit lottery winners
to assign their rights to lottery winnings.9 7 In 2000 Womack and
Spiridakos each sold the rights to their remaining future installment
payments to a finance company for a lump sum payment. 98 Womack
received a payment of $1.328 million for his sixteen remaining installments, and Spiridakos received a payment of $2.125 million for her ten
remaining installments. Both Womack and Spiridakos reported these
lump sum payments as income from the sale of long-term capital assets
in 2000. 99
The government issued notices of deficiency to the Taxpayers for tax
year 2000 for amounts attributable to their respective failures to pay tax
on the lump sum payments as ordinary income. Each of the Taxpayers
filed a petition with the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the tax

94. 510 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
95. Id. at 1297.
96. Womack v. Comm'r (Womack I), 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 410, 411 (2006).
97. Womack H, 510 F.3d at 1297.
98. Womack I, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 411. As required by Florida law, the Taxpayers each
obtained Florida Circuit Court approval to assign their respective rights to receive future
lottery winnings before making the assignments. Womack H, 510 F.3d at 1298 n.1; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 24.1153(1) (West 2003).
99. Womack I, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 411-12.
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due. °0 The Tax Court consolidated the two petitions because the facts
in the two cases were alike in every material detail.' 1 The Tax Court
denied both petitions on November
7, 2006. The Taxpayers appealed the
10 2
case to the Eleventh Circuit.

The Eleventh Circuit, following the precedent established by a number
of other circuit courts, affirmed the Tax Court's decision.' 3 The issue
before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the gain from the sale of a right
to receive future lottery payments was taxable as capital gain or as
ordinary income.' °4
According to § 122105 of the Code, the term "capital asset" is broadly
defined as "property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with
his trade or business)."'
Also listed under § 1221 are a number of
exclusions from the definition of capital asset, but none are directly
relevant to the lottery rights at issue in Womack. 10 ' Gain from the
sale or exchange of a long-term capital asset, which is defined as a
capital asset held by the taxpayer for more than one year, is a capital
gain subject to reduced rates of taxation.' 8 Other income, or "ordinary
income," is taxed at a higher rate. 109 As stated by the Eleventh
Circuit, "Congress intended ordinary income to be the default tax rate,
with capital gains treatment an exception applicable only in appropriate
cases." 10 Consequently, the definition of capital asset "'is to be
construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford
capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the
realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of
time.'""'
The government argued that the rights to the remaining installment
payments were not capital assets because, had the Taxpayers retained
those rights, the installment payments would have been ordinary income

100. Womack 1I, 510 F.3d at 1298.
101. Womack I, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 412. In addition, fifty-seven related cases brought
by Florida State Lottery winners were not consolidated with the cases of Womack and
Spiridakos, but the parties in those fifty-seven cases agreed to be bound by the outcome
of the consolidated cases in the Tax Court. Id. at 411 n.1.
102. Womack H, 510 F.3d at 1298.
103. Id. at 1300-01, 1307.
104. See id. at 1298.
105. I.R.C. § 1221 (2000).
106. Id. § 1221(a).
107. See id.
108. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
109. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61, 63, 64 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
110. Womack 1I, 510 F.3d at 1299.
111. Id. (quoting Comm'r v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960)).
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to the Taxpayers." 2 This argument was based on the substitute for
ordinary income doctrine. 113 The basic principle of the doctrine was4
expressed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. P G. Lake, Inc."
The Tax Court in Womack I restated the Court's holding in P. G. Lake:
"if a taxpayer merely transfers for consideration the right to receive
ordinary income in the future, the right transferred will not be treated
as a capital asset."" 5 This doctrine is meant to prevent taxpayers
from "circumvent[ing] ordinary income tax treatment by packaging
ordinary income payments and selling them to a third party."" 6
Several other United States Courts of Appeals have considered whether
rights to lottery winnings are capital assets," 7 and all of these courts
have denied capital asset status on the basis of the substitute for
ordinary income doctrine."'
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that sales of rights to lottery installment
payments "are a clear case of a substitute for ordinary income.""19 As
illustrated by the Taxpayers' own treatments of the installment
payments as ordinary income prior to selling the rights to future
payments, a lump sum payment received in exchange for the rights to
future installments simply serves as a replacement for fiture ordinary
income."O The Eleventh Circuit listed two primary factors that more
specifically justify the application of the substitute for ordinary income
doctrine to the sale of future lottery payments.' 2 ' First, the rights to
future lottery payments, unlike capital assets, "involve no underlying
investment of capital."'22 Any gain received from the sale of such
rights "reflects no change in the value of the asset [but] is simply the
amount Taxpayers would have received eventually, discounted to present
value." 23 Second, even though the income from a lottery payment
"does not accrue until the scheduled annual payment date," the right to
such lottery payments is "income that is already earned, not a right to

112. See id.; Womack I, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 412.
113. Womack H, 510 F.3d at 1299.
114. 356 U.S. 260, 266 (1958).
115. Womack I, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 413 (citing P. G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 266).
116. Womack II, 510 F.3d at 1301.
117. See, e.g., Prebola v. Comm'r, 482 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2007); Watkins v. Comm'r, 447
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006); Lattera v. Comm'r, 437 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007); United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
118. Womack H, 510 F.3d at 1300.
119. Id. at 1301.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 1301-02.
122. Id. at 1301.
123. Id.
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earn income in the future."'24 In contrast, "[a] capital asset has the
potential to earn income in the future based on the owner's actions in
using it." 2 '
Lastly, the Taxpayers argued that regardless of the applicability of the
substitute for ordinary income doctrine, the lottery rights at issue
constituted "property" under § 1221 of the Code, and therefore were
capital assets. 126 The Taxpayers relied on the most general definition
of "property," which includes "anything owned," even income and any
rights or claims to it.127 Yet again, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed this
theory, stating:
Even if other statutes use "property" in this broad sense, to exclude
substitutes for income in determining what constitutes a capital asset
is consistent with the word "property." No other interpretation of
"property" would harmonize with the statute's purpose, as the very
nature of the term "capital asset" excludes what is in essence ordinary
income. 2 '
The Eleventh Circuit in Womack joined the other courts of appeals in
holding that rights to future lottery payments are not capital assets.
While the Eleventh Circuit did analyze each of the arguments raised by
the Taxpayers, it appeared that the Taxpayers were never going to be
able to overcome the prior precedent on this issue.
III.

A.

DISTRICT COURT AND TAX COURT CASES

Tax Court Upholds Findingof Fraud in Ballard Case
In Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner,129 the latest (though perhaps

not last) chapter in the Ballard saga," ° the Tax Court upheld its

124. Id. at 1302.
125. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the Taxpayers' argument that even if the
sale of the rights to the future lottery payments would be covered by the traditional
substitute for ordinary income doctrine, such rights are not controlled by the doctrine as
modified by Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). Womack H, 510

F.3d at 1303. The Eleventh Circuit held that Arkansas Best was inapposite. See id. at
1302-03.
126. See Womack H, 510 F.3d at 1305-06.
127. Id. at 1304.
128. Id.
129. 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 721 (2007).
130. See Inv. Research Assocs. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (1999), affd, Ballard
v. Comm'r, 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Ballard v. Comm'r, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).
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earlier finding that Claude M. Ballard and others fraudulently failed to
report income from a kickback scheme.13'
13 2
The procedural background to this decision is long and convoluted.
The case was heard originally by Tax Court Special Trial Judge D. Irvin
Couvillion, who prepared an initial report (the "STJ Report"). Then the
case was assigned to Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr. for adoption of the
STJ Report and entry of decision.' 33 Judge Dawson and Special Trial
Judge Couvillion collaborated in preparing the final report, in which the
court upheld the government's determination that Ballard and others
fraudulently failed to report income from a kickback scheme.'
Under
Rule 183' of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, as in
effect at the time, the STJ Report36 was neither filed nor otherwise
entered into the record of the case.
137
The Tax Court's decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit.
However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that
the collaborative process used by the Tax Court was not warranted by
Rule 183, and that the STJ Report was required to be included in the
record to permit fully informed appellate review. 138 On remand, the
Eleventh Circuit obtained the STJ Report, in which Special Trial Judge
Couvillion found that Ballard was not liable for the tax deficiencies
asserted against him, concluded that there was no kickback scheme, and
139
held that the government's allegations of fraud were unwarranted.
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court, stating:
(1) The "collaborative report and opinion" of the Tax Court is ordered
stricken; (2) The original report of the special trial judge is ordered
reinstated; (3) The Chief Judge of the Tax Court is instructed to assign
this matter to a regular Tax Court Judge who had no involvement in
the preparation of the aforementioned "collaborative report;" (4) The
Tax Court shall proceed to review this matter in accordance with the
dictates of the Supreme Court, and with the Tax Court's newly revised
Rules 182 and 183, giving "due regard" to the credibility determina-

131. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 805.
132. For more detailed discussions of the history of Estate of Kanter, see Donald R. Bly
& Michael H. Plowgian, Federal Taxation, 55 MERCER L. REv. 1313 (2004); Plowgian,
Minkov & Brinkley, supra note 25.
133. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 729.

134. Id.
135. TAx CT. R. 183.
136. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 730 (citing Ballard, 544 U.S. at 45).
137. Ballard, 321 F.3d at 1046.
138. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65. Tax Court Rule 183 was amended in response to the
Supreme Court's decision. See Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 730.
139. Ballard v. Comm'r, 429 F.3d 1026, 1029 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
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tions of the special trial judge and presuming correct fact findings of
the trial judge. 4 °
The Eleventh Circuit also instructed the Tax Court that the STJ
Report's findings of fact were presumed correct "unless manifestly
unreasonable.""'
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
rejecting the credibility determination of the original fact-finder (unless
a reason for the rejection could be articulated from the trial transcript)
would ordinarily require rehearing the testimony, which was foreclosed
14 2
in this case by the deaths of all the primary witnesses.
On remand, the Tax Court upheld its finding of fraud against Ballard
and the other taxpayers, finding that the STJ Report's conclusions and
credibility determinations were "manifestly unreasonable."143 Under
the amended Rule 183,1" the judge to whom a case is assigned "may
adopt the Special Trial Judge's recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or may modify or reject them in whole or in
part."'4 5 Thus, the Tax Court did "not feel constrained from correcting
manifestly unreasonable findings of fact or making additional findings
of fact, so long as any additional facts find direct support in the case
record."' 46
The Tax Court noted the well-established principle that the findings
of fact and credibility determinations made by the presiding judge in a
trial are presumed to be correct unless manifestly unreasonable.' 47
Based on established caselaw, however, the Tax Court reasoned that it
could reject a finding of fact in the STJ Report if "the recommended
finding of fact or testimony (1) is internally inconsistent or so implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not believe it, or (2) is not
credible because it is directly contradicted by documentary or objective
evidence."' 48 Finally, the Tax Court concluded that, notwithstanding
the fact that it could not retry the case, it could reject the STJ Report's
credibility determinations when they were manifestly unreasonable
149
based on the record.

140. Id. at 1027.
141. Id. at 1032.
142. Id.
143. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 788.
144. TAX CT. R. 183 (as amended in 2005).
145. Estate of Kanter, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) at 730.

146. Id. at 733.
147. Id.
148.
149.

Id. at 735.
Id.
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The Tax Court concluded that the Special Trial Judge misunderstood
or misstated the government's theory of the kickback scheme and that
this misunderstanding caused the STJ Report's conclusions to be
manifestly unreasonable. 5 °
Fundamentally, the STJ Report gave
undue weight to testimony by the ultimate sources of the kickback
payments (referred to by the court as "The Five") that they were not
involved in a kickback scheme, which caused the STJ Report to overlook
substantial evidence of fraud in the record.'
According to the Tax
Court, the fact that The Five did not know that they were involved in a
kickback scheme was irrelevant.'5 2
The Five made payments to
Kanter, one of the participants in the scheme, who then made kickback
payments to the other participants, including Ballard, for funneling
business to The Five.' 53 The government's contention was that Kanter,
Ballard, and the other defendants fraudulently failed to report those
payments properly as income, using a complex web of entities and
transactions to hide the income.'
The Tax Court engaged in a lengthy review of the STJ Report's
findings of fact, which it supplemented with additional facts from the
record. The Tax Court supported its conclusions in mind-numbing
detail, poring through bank statements to trace the flow of funds to
Ballard and the other petitioners and comparing their testimony with
the objective facts of the record.' 55 For example, the Tax Court went
through payments made by The Five to Investment Research Associates,
Ltd. ("IRA") over the course of thirteen years.'5 6 The Tax Court then
catalogued payments and transfers from IRA to multiple entities
controlled by Ballard, Kanter, the other participants, and their
respective family members.'57 These transfers, which Ballard did not
include as taxable income, included loans to Ballard and his family
members that were never repaid, as well as "consulting payments" to
58
Ballard's adult children for no discernible consulting services.
The STJ Report, however, contained only a limited discussion
concerning loans to certain petitioners and their family trusts, and it did
not include an analysis of the flow of funds that the government offered
as proof that the payments from The Five constituted taxable income

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 744, 787.
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id.
See id. at 767-82.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 767-82.
See id. at 772-73, 776-77.
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earned by Ballard and the other petitioners.5 9 The STJ Report's
failure to analyze the objective facts of the case and its reliance instead
on the petitioners' testimony that they were not engaged in fraud was
160
manifestly unreasonable in the Tax Court's opinion.
Based on its review of the record, the Tax Court concluded that the
testimonies of Ballard and the other petitioners generally were
16 1
implausible in light of the objective facts of the transactions.
Moreover, the Tax Court sustained the government's argument that the
entities utilized by the petitioners to hide their income were shams that
could be disregarded and that the petitioners were required to report
that income as their own.'62 Based on these findings, the Tax Court
upheld the government's determination that Ballard and the other
petitioners filed false and fraudulent tax returns, and thus, the
petitioners were liable for additions to tax due to fraud.'
It is not clear whether the Tax Court's detailed and thorough analysis
will be sufficient to overcome the deference that should be accorded to
the STJ Report in light of the opinions by the Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit. Given the time and resources already spent on this
case, however, we may hope that the Tax Court's decision is the last
word in this matter.
B. Universal Service Support Payments to a Telephone Company Are
Gross Income, and Not Contributionsto Capital
In United States v. Coastal Utilities, Inc.,"64 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted the government's request for summary judgment and held that both universal
support payments received by a telephone company from the federal
government and access funds received from Georgia were income to the
telephone company, not contributions to capital excluded from tax. 165
Coastal Utilities, Inc. ("Coastal") is a company that provides local and
long distance telephone services to residential and business customers
in and around Liberty County, Georgia. 6
Coastal maintains a
network of loops, switches, and trunks necessary for the provision of

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
court's
United
166.

Id. at 767.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 802.
See id. at 804.
Id. at 805.
483 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (S.D. Ga. 2007).
Id. at 1251. On January 23, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
decision in a per curiam opinion that adopted the district court's order in full. See
States v. Coastal Utils., Inc., 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008).
Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
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telephone services." 7 The costs per subscriber for providing loops,
switches, and trunks in rural areas is higher than the costs in more
densely populated areas because the companies (1) cannot take
advantage of the economies of scale that carriers enjoy in more densely
populated areas, (2) have to maintain longer loop lengths, and (3) often
have to overcome challenges of rural topography.'
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the telephone system of the
United States was structured on the belief that every person should have
access to a telephone for outgoing calls. 169 The vision of universal
service was first incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934"0°
171
and later in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act").
According to section 254(b)(3) of the 1996 Act, 172 "[clonsumers in all
regions of the Nation, including low-income consumers and those in
rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications and information services ... at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas." 17 While
Congress delegated the responsibility for determining what services
must be universally offered and the specific methods to support
universal service to the Federal Communications Commission (the
"FCC"), Congress also set forth principles upon which the FCC was to
base its policies for the preservation and enhancement of universal
service. 17 In May of 1997 the FCC issued an order establishing the

167. Id. The district court explained:
A "loop" is the circuit that connects a subscriber to Coastal's central switching
office.... In 1998, Coastal's service area had approximately 38,000 loops.
A "switch" is the piece of equipment that routes each call to the proper recipient
based on the digits dialed by the initiator of the call. If the call is a local call, the
switch directs the call to the loop that connects to the recipient's premises. If the
call is long distance, the switch directs the call to a trunk. A "trunk" is the facility
that connects Coastal's network with the networks of other providers, such as long
distance companies.
Id.
168.
169.
170.
(2000)).
171.
U.S.C.).
172.
173.
174.
"quality

Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1234.
Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47

Id., 110 Stat. at 71 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2000)).
Id.
Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. Some of those principles included (i)
services should be available at just, reasonable and affordable rates," (ii) access
to advanced telecommunications should be provided in all regions of the country, (iii) the
rates and quality of service for low-income consumers or consumers in rural areas should
be reasonably comparable to those in urban areas, and (iv) all providers of telecommunica-
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services that must be universally available and indicating that carriers
who provide these services are eligible to receive federal universal
service support under four programs, including the High Cost Program. 17 5 A carrier who receives support under the High Cost Program
may only use such support "'for the provision, maintenance, and
upgrading of facilities and services for which the support is intend76
ed.'"

1

As the district court explained, "the High Cost Program provides
qualifying local exchange carriers with funds to extend the telecommunications infrastructure into rural and other high-cost areas where such
investment would not otherwise be economically viable."177
The
program is funded by payments from every telecommunications carrier
and includes a variety of funding mechanisms, three of which were
applicable to Coastal: (1) High Cost Loop Support, (2) Local Switching
Support, and (3) Long Term Support.17' As the court described these
programs:
The High Cost Loop Support mechanism provides funding to rural
telephone companies whose average cost per loop is greater than 115%
of the nationwide average. The Local Switching Support mechanism
provides funds to those companies that serve study areas with 50,000
or fewer loops. These funds support costs incurred in switching calls
between loops, if the call is local, or between a trunk and a loop if the
call is long distance. The Long Term Support mechanism allows a
carrier to recover a portion of loop costs that have been allocated to the
provision of interstate services.'79
The State of Georgia also implemented a program that "enabled
telephone companies to recover revenues lost as a result of a mandated
reduction of intrastate charges," and Coastal received amounts under
that program as well."' °
In its amended federal income tax return for 1998, Coastal excluded
from income the universal service support payments it received from
both the federal government and Georgia as nonshareholder contributions to capital.'
In June 2004 the United States filed a lawsuit
against Coastal that contended the funds Coastal received under the

tions services should make equitable contributions to universal service. Id. at 1235 n.3.
175. Id. at 1235-36.
176. Id. at 1236 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2000)).
177. Id. at 1237.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1238. The state program is the Georgia Universal Access Fund. Id.
181. Id. at 1234.
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High Cost Program and the Georgia access funds program were
includable in gross income as a subsidy.182
According to § 61(a)"'3 of the Code, "gross income means all income
from whatever source derived."" 4
However, § 118(a)8 5 excludes
8 6
the capital of the taxpayer."
to
contribution
"any
from gross income
Treasury Regulation § 1.118-11s' provides that a contribution to capital
can be of either money or property, and that it can be made by
shareholders or nonshareholders. ' The regulation adds:
For example, the exclusion applies to the value of land or other
property contributed to a corporation by a governmental unit or by a
civic group for the purpose of inducing the corporation to locate its
business in a particular community, or for the purpose of enabling the
corporation to expand its operating facilities. However, the exclusion
does not apply to any money or property transferred to the corporation
in consideration for goods or services rendered, or to subsidies paid for
the purpose of inducing the taxpayer to limit production.' 89
The legislative history of § 118 indicates that the statute was meant to
"place[I in the code the court decisions on this subject."190
At the time of the enactment of § 118, "the Supreme Court had issued
opinions in several significant cases regarding exclusions for nonshareholder contributions to capital." 1 '
First, as the district court in

Coastal Utilities explained, in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co.:192
the Supreme Court held that subsidy payments by the Cuban government for the construction and operation of a railroad did not constitute
taxable income.... [Tihe subsidy payments "were proportionate to
mileage completed" and "necessary to construct the railroad." This
indicated a "purpose to reimburse [the taxpayer] for capital expenditures." Furthermore, the payments ...were "not made for services

182. Id.
183. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
184. Id.
185. I.R.C. § 118(a) (2000).
186. Id.
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (2001).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4042; S. REP.
NO. 83-1622 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4648.
191. Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
192. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
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rendered or to be rendered;" and they were "not profits or gains from
the use or operation of the railroad."' 93
Seven years later, however, in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States,' "the Court held that government payments to a railroad to
guarantee a minimum operating income were not contributions to
capital" because "the 'purpose of the guaranty provision was to stabilize
the credit position of the [raillroads by assuring them a minimum
operating income,"' and thus, the payments were a supplement to
income, not a capital contribution. 195
Next, as the district court in Coastal Utilities explained in Detroit
196
Edison Co. v. Commissioner:
the Court held that payments made by prospective customers of an
electric company to cover the cost of extending the utility's facilities to
the customers' homes were part of the price of services and not
contributions to capital [blecause the transferors made the payments
with the intention of receiving a direct benefit in the form of specific
services. 197
In Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner,'9 however, the Supreme Court
held that "transfers of cash and other property made by civic groups to
induce the taxpayer to build and operate facilities in their communities
or expand the facilities already there" were contributions to capital
because the contributors' motivation was "that the transactions would
benefit the community at large by providing jobs."' 9
Thus, the
decisions in Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe established that the
contributor's motivation is a primary factor in determining whether a
payment is a contribution to capital or income. ° °
Finally, in 1973 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Chicago,

Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. (CB&Q).2 '

In CB&Q the govern-

ment paid a "railroad to fund improvements to highway crossings,
crossing signals, signs, and lighting. . ., but [the railroad] assumed the
responsibility of maintaining the facilities at its own expense." 20 2 "The

193. Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (second brackets in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Edwards, 268 U.S. at 632-33).
194. 286 U.S. 285 (1932).

195. Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry., 286 U.S. at 289).
196.

319 U.S. 98 (1943).

197. Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (citation omitted).
198.
199.

339 U.S. 583 (1950).
Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.

200.

See Detroit Edison, 319 U.S. at 102; Brown Shoe, 339 U.S. at 591.

201.
202.

412 U.S. 401 (1973).
Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
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Court held that the government subsidies were not contributions to
capital and could not be depreciated." °3 In arriving at its conclusion,
the Supreme Court listed five characteristics that indicate that a
payment is a contribution to capital and not a subsidy: (i) the funds
became "a permanent part of the transferee's working capital structure,"
(ii) the funds were "not [a] compensation" for services, (iii) the funds
were bargained for, (iv) the transferred asset resulted in "benefit to the
transferee in an amount commensurate with its value," and (v) the asset
was "employed in ...the production of additional income."" 4

In Coastal Utilities, both Coastal and the government agreed "that the
contributor motivation test and the CB&Q factors provide the applicable
standard for determining whether the universal [service] support
payments were income or a contribution to capital." °5 Based on these
tests, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia granted the government's motion for summary judgment and
held that the payments made to Coastal under the High Cost Program
and the Georgia Universal Access Funds program were gross income to
Coastal, not a contribution to capital. 0 6 In a detailed opinion, the
court noted that the method for calculating the amounts of universal
support strongly suggested that the purpose of the payments was to
supplement Coastal's income, even though the amounts under the
program were largely based on Coastal's investment expenditures.0 7
In particular, the court pointed out that the amounts of the universal
support payments under all three federal programs were based on an
investment return on Coastal's expenses (including expenses directly
related to the provision of universal services and other expenses
unrelated to capital investment), and therefore, the payments were
supplemental income and not a contribution to capital. 0 8
For example, under the High Cost Loop Support program, Coastal was
entitled to receive support equal to 65% of its costs that were between
115% and 150% of the national average cost per loop, and indeed it
received $1,814,115.209 To arrive at Coastal's cost per loop, however,
the FCC included many of Coastal's operating expenses that were
unrelated to either the construction or the maintenance of the loops,
such as wages and benefits for employees performing work unrelated to

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
CB&Q, 412 U.S. at 413.
Coastal Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
Id.
Id. at 1241-42.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
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capital projects, and corporate operating expenses, such as director and
officer salaries.21 ° The district court further reasoned that these
payments under the High Cost Loop Support program were not
calculated based on a proposal to build new loops but instead were based
on the total number of working loops, thus indicating the payments were
intended to add to the return on Coastal's existing services rather than
to pay for expanding and upgrading the infrastructure.'
Coastal argued that because the purpose behind the concept of
universal service was to benefit the public and because the payments
were not for particular services, the Supreme Court's decisions in Detroit
Edison and Brown Shoe should have controlled, and the universal
service payments should have been a contribution to capital.2 12 The
district court reasoned, however, that Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe
stand for the proposition that "if a payment is made in exchange for
specific goods and services, then that payment is income and not a
contribution to capital," and not for Coastal's proposition that if a
payment is made for a public purpose, then such payment would always
be a contribution to capital.2 3" The district court based its conclusion
on CB&Q, in which "the Supreme Court held that even though the
payments were not compensation for services, and were for a more
general public benefit," the CB&Q factors should determine whether
such payments were income or a contribution to capital.1 4
The district court also dismissed Coastal's argument that because "[b]y
statute, the High Cost Program Funds may be used 'only for the
provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services for
which the support is intended,"' such amounts were pegged to Coastal's
investment and should be considered a contribution to capital.215 The
district court distinguished a return on a previously made investment
from the making of a capital investment and reasoned that the universal
service funds were not directly paying for a capital expenditure but were
giving incentives to telecommunication providers to develop infrastructure by offering them a return on their investment.1 6
In addition, the district court found that "a detailed holding as to each
of the five CB&Q factors would not [have been] helpful" because some

210.
211.
and the
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 1243. The district court's analysis of the Local Switching Support program
Long Term Support program was similar. Id. at 1243-44.
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id. (citing CB&Q, 412 U.S. at 413-14).
Id. at 1246 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 254(e)).
Id. at 1247.
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of the CB&Q factors were not clearly applicable to Coastal's case, and
the contributor's motivation as previously determined should have
controlled the determination of whether the universal support payments
should have been treated as gross income or a contribution to Coastal's
capital.217
Finally, the district court held that because the calculation of the
Georgia Universal Access Fund's payments was tailored to reimburse the
revenue Coastal lost due to the reduction in its intrastate rates, such
funds
should also have been income and not a contribution to capi2 18
tal.
The district court's holding is hard to analyze without the benefit of
a more detailed description of the methodology utilized in calculating the
payments under the High Cost Program. Based on the district court's
opinion, it appears that certain costs, which were not directly attributable to the provision of universal telecommunications services, were
included in the calculation of the support payments to Coastal under the
High Cost Program, and a return on all costs was included in some
calculations.2 19 On balance, however, it seems the general intent of
the payments under the High Cost Program was to reimburse the
telecommunication companies for the additional costs that they incurred
in servicing high-cost areas, not to supplement their income. 22 ' Thus,
in the case of the High Cost Loop Support program, Coastal's revenue
from the provision of telephone services appears to have had no impact
on the amount of the payments that were made to Coastal.2 2 1 It is
therefore somewhat unclear whether such payments can be fairly
classified as supplementing Coastal's income when Coastal's income was
not taken into account. 22 2 Furthermore, the district court's refusal to
223
provide an explicit analysis of the application of the CB&Q factors
is perplexing in light of its statement that CB&Q is the "seminal case
regarding nonshareholder contributions."2 24 While the district court's
arguments that several of those factors appear inapplicable to Coastal
seem convincing, those arguments should not have precluded the district
court from analyzing the remaining factors. 225
Nonetheless, the
district court's decision was likely informed by a more detailed analysis

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1248.
Id.
See id. at 1242-43.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1240.
See id. at 1248-50.
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of the facts than set forth in the published opinion because it had the
benefit of reviewing the detailed statements and the parties' explanations about the methods used to calculate the universal support
payments.
C. Six-Year Statute of Limitations Applies to Adjustment of
PartnershipIncome from Tax Shelter Transaction
In Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States,226 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a partnership's
motion for summary judgment after finding that the extended six-year
statute of limitations applied to allow the Service to adjust certain items
on the partnership's 1998 tax return.227 The adjustment at issue was
made in response to Brandon Ridge Partners' participation in a so-called
Son of BOSS 228 tax shelter transaction. 229 Nelson Jefferson was a
majority shareholder in Florida Electronic Supply, Inc. ("FES"), a
subchapter S corporation.23 ° In 1998 Jefferson decided to sell his FES
stock, "which had a relatively low basis," and engage in certain
transactions to try to reduce his taxable gain on the sale of the FES
stock. 231 First, Jefferson formed NJ Investments, LLC ("NJI") and
Brandon Ridge, Inc., a subchapter S corporation (the "S Corporation"),
both wholly owned by Jefferson.2 32 Jefferson also formed Brandon
Ridge Partners (the "Partnership"), in which Jefferson and his then-wife
owned all of the interests.23 3 Next, Jefferson, acting through NJI,
engaged in a short sale of treasury notes. 234 NJI borrowed treasury
notes and sold them to a third party, retaining the obligation to replace
the borrowed treasury notes. NJI then contributed the $3,258,458 in
proceeds from the short sale and the corresponding obligation to replace
the treasury notes to the Partnership. Shortly afterward, the Partnership satisfied the obligation on the short sale, and Jefferson contributed

226. No. 8:06-cv-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007).
227. Id. at *13.
228. Id. at *4. Son of BOSS is a variation of a tax shelter known as a "Bond and
Option Sales Strategy." For a full description, see Kligfeld Holdings v. Commissioner, 128
T.C. 192, 194 (2007).
229. Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 VL 2209129, at *4.
230. Id. at *1.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *2.
233. Id. Jefferson owned a ninety-nine percent interest and his then-wife, Carolyn
Jefferson, owned a one percent interest in Brandon Ridge Partners. Id.
234. Id. This Article assumes that NJI is a disregarded entity for tax purposes because
the court treats the contribution of the short sale proceeds and liability as contributions
by Jefferson himself.
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his FES stock to the Partnership as a capital contribution. Thereafter,
Jefferson and his wife contributed ninety-nine percent of their interests
in the Partnership to the S Corporation.2 35
As a result of the above actions, the S Corporation held a ninety-nine
percent interest in the Partnership, and Jefferson held the remaining
one percent interest."' Since Jefferson owned 100% of the S Corporation, both the Partnership and the S Corporation were controlled by
Jefferson. 237 Nevertheless, Jefferson's transfer of ninety-nine percent
of his interest in the Partnership caused a technical termination of the
Partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B)"' of the Code.239 The "new" Partnership made an election under § 754240 of the Code, which allows a
partnership to adjust the basis of its property in accordance with
§ 743(b)241 of the Code upon the sale or exchange of a partnership
interest.2 42 The adjustment provided for in § 743(b) allows the partnership to "increase the adjusted basis of the partnership property by
the excess of the basis to the transferee partner of his interest in the
partnership over his proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the
partnership property."2 43 The Partnership took the position that, as
a result of the § 743(b) adjustment, the Partnership's basis in the FES
stock was increased by $3,258,458, which was the S Corporation's
purported outside basis in its interest in the Partnership. 244 Thus,
when the Partnership sold the FES stock for $3,315,000 to an unrelated
third party, the Partnership only reported a gain of $31,042 on the sale
because of the claimed increase in the Partnership's basis in the
stock.245

235. Id. Jefferson contributed a ninety-eight percent interest in the Partnership to the
S Corporation and retained a one percent interest, while Carolyn Jefferson contributed her
entire one percent interest in the Partnership to the S Corporation. Id.
236. Id. at *2 & n.3.
237. Id. at *2.
238. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) (2000). ("[A] partnership shall be considered as terminated
...if... within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of the
total interest in partnership capital and profits.").
239. Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *2.
240. I.R.C. § 754 (2000).
241. I.R.C. § 743(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
242. Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *2; I.R.C. § 754.
243. I.R.C. § 743(b)(1).
244. BrandonRidge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *2. "'Inside basis is a partnership's
basis in the property which it owns .... Outside basis is an individual partner's basis in
his interest in the partnership itself.'" Id. at *3 (quoting Kligfeld Holdings, 128 T.C. at
196).
245. Id. at *2.
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On February 22, 2006, the Service issued a notice of Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment ("FPAA"), which notified the parties to the
transaction that it intended to adjust the Partnership's income for the
1998 tax year.2 46 The Service took the position that the transactions
described above lacked economic substance.2 47 As a result, the Service
asserted that the parties to the transactions incorrectly calculated their
bases in their partnership interests in several instances. First, when the
proceeds of the short sale were contributed to the Partnership, Jefferson's outside basis in the Partnership was properly increased by the
amount of the proceeds contributed.2 4' However, the Service contended
that Jefferson should have simultaneously decreased his outside basis
in the Partnership by the value of the obligation to cover the short sale
because a partner's outside basis decreases when the partnership
assumes a partner's liability. 249
Consequently, Jefferson's outside
basis in the Partnership, which Jefferson reported as $3,258,458, was
substantially overstated within the meaning of § 6501(e)(1)(A) 250 and
should have been zero. 251 Next, Jefferson and his then-wife transferred their interests in the Partnership to the S Corporation, and the
S Corporation properly took the same outside basis in the Partnership
that Jefferson and his then-wife held before the transfer.21 2 However,
the S Corporation's outside basis in the Partnership was overstated
because Jefferson's outside basis in the Partnership was likewise
overstated.2 3
Therefore, when the Partnership made the § 754
election, no adjustment to the basis of the assets was necessary because
the S Corporation's basis in its interest in the Partnership was zero.254
Thus, upon the sale of the FES stock, the Partnership recognized a gain
of $3,289,500 and not $31,042.255
The Partnership filed a lawsuit opposing the FPAA in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and subsequently

246. Id.
247. Id. at *3.
248. Id.; see I.R.C. § 722 (2000).
249. Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *3; see Treas. Reg. § 1.722-1 (as
amended in 2004). Although the issue was not discussed in the court's opinion because it
was not relevant to the summary judgment motion, Jefferson and the Partnership
presumably intended to argue that Jefferson was not required to reduce his outside basis
in the Partnership because the obligation to satisfy the short sale was a contingent
liability.
250. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
251. Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *8.
252. Id. at *3; see I.R.C. § 362 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
253. Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *3.
254. Id. at *4.
255. Id.
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filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the proposed
Under § 6501(a) 257 of
adjustment to its income was time-barred.2 5
the Code, the Service has three years from the date on which a partner's
individual tax return is filed to assess a tax on that partner.258
However, § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Code extends this three-year statute of
limitations to six years if the partner "omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of
the amount of gross income stated in the return."25
However, the
Code further states:
In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not
be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income
stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a
statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the
Secretary of the nature and amount of such item.260
In this case, Jefferson filed his individual tax return for 1998 on October
5, 1999.261 While the FPAA was not issued within six years of such
date, a summons was issued prior to the FPAA that arguably tolled the
six-year statute of limitations period. Therefore, both sides assumed for
purposes of the summary judgment motion that the FPAA was issued
outside of the three-year statute of limitations period but within the sixyear statute of limitations period.26 2 Based on § 6501(a), the Partnership claimed that the three-year statute of limitations barred the
Service's FPAA. The Service responded that the six-year statute was
applicable because the Partnership had omitted sufficient income from
its return without providing adequate disclosure of such omission.2"
The court denied the Partnership's summary judgment motion and
held that under the assumption that the correct basis of the FES stock
was zero, the six-year statute of limitations of § 6501(e)(1)(A) applied. 264 The court first assessed whether the Partnership had omitted
gross income in excess of twenty-five percent of the amount of gross

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
I.R.C. § 6501(a).
Id.
Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A).
Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).
Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *2.
Id. at *4 n.7. The Partnership did not challenge the timeliness of the FPAA under

the six-year statute of limitations. The Partnership conceivably could still raise this issue
in the future, but the court's opinion does not provide enough facts to determine what the
basis of such a challenge would be. Id.
263.

Id. at *4.

264. Id. at *12.
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income stated in the return.265 The Partnership reported the following
information regarding the stock sale: "(1) the sales price was $3,315,000;
(2) the purported basis of the FES stock was $3,283,958; and (3) the gain
on the sale totaled $31,042.26 The Partnership argued that it did not
omit gross income, even assuming the correct basis of the stock was zero,
because "gross income" for these purposes meant gross receipts, which
in this case was the $3,315,000 earned on the stock sale, a figure which
the Service did not dispute. The Partnership cited several cases that
supported its argument that gross income meant gross receipts.2 67 The
Service countered that, under the current version of the Code, gross
income means gross receipts in the case of a sale of business goods and
services, and thus the gross receipts test did not apply to the sale of the
FES stock because the FES stock was not business goods and services. 26 8 According to § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), "[iun the case of a trade or
business, the term 'gross income' means the total of the amounts
received or accrued from the sale of goods or services ... prior to
diminution by the cost of such sales or services." 26" The sale of the
FES stock was not a sale of business goods and services, and thus the
Service argued that an application of the gross receipts test to the sale
of the FES stock "would render § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) superfluous." 270 The
court agreed with the Service and held that the Partnership omitted
gross income from its return under § 6501(e)(1)(A). 27'
Finally, the court determined that the Partnership did not adequately
disclose the amounts omitted from gross income pursuant to § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) 2 The court agreed with the Partnership that for purposes
of adequate disclosure, the court must consider not only the Partnership's 1998 return but also the returns of Jefferson and the S Corporation because Jefferson's return referred to his interests in both the
Partnership and the S Corporation.2 7 3 However, the court determined
that none of the three returns adequately disclosed that the proceeds of
the short sale and the obligation to replace the borrowed treasury notes
were contributed to the Partnership. 7 4 The court also found that

265.
266.
267.
Ltd. v.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.; Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207 (2007); Grapevine Imps.,
United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505 (2007); Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *6.
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
Brandon Ridge Partners,2007 WL 2209129, at *6.
See id. at *8.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *12.
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Jefferson did not reduce his basis in the Partnership by the value of the
contributed obligation, and the returns did not disclose that either the
basis of the FES stock was increased under § 754 or that the FES stock
was the only investment asset held by the Partnership." 5 The Court
concluded:
As presented in the returns and statements attached thereto, the
substance of the transactions relating to the sale of the FES stock
(which included the contribution to the Partnership of the obligation to
cover the short sale of the Treasury Notes and the effect on the
Jefferson's [sic] basis in the Partnership) was not disclosed in a manner
that was adequate to apprise the IRS of the true amount of capital gain
that resulted from the sale of the FES stock. 6
In concluding that the six-year statute of limitations applied, the court
appeared to set a relatively high bar for the Partnership to clear to
escape § 6501(e)(1)(A), and the blatant nature of the tax shelter
transaction at issue may have played a role in the court's analysis.27 7

275. Id.
276. Id. at *11.
277. Id. at *12.

